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Abstract
Manufacturers often face a choice of whether to recover the value in their end-of-life prod-
ucts through remanufacturing. In many cases, firms choose not to remanufacture, as they are
(rightly) concerned that the remanufactured product will cannibalize sales of the higher-margin
new product. However, such a strategy may backfire for manufacturers operating in indus-
tries where their end-of-life products (cell phones, tires, computers, automotive parts, etc) are
attractive to third-party remanufacturers, who may seriously cannibalize sales of the original
manufacturer. In this paper, we develop models to support a manufacturer’s recovery strategy
in the face of a competitive threat on the remanufactured product market. We first analyze the
competition between new and remanufactured products produced by a monopolist manufacturer
and identify conditions under which the firm would choose not to remanufacture its products.
We then characterize the potential profit loss due to external remanufacturing competition and
analyze two entry-deterrent strategies: remanufacturing and preemptive collection. We find
that a firm may choose to remanufacture or preemptively collect its used products to deter
entry, even when the firm would not have chosen to do so under a pure monopoly environment.
Finally, we discuss conditions under which each strategy is more beneficial.
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1 Introduction
Industrialization and population growth have increasingly burdened the environment. To give one
of many examples, in 2001, US residents, businesses and institutions produced more than 229
million tons of Municipal Solid Waste, as a result of an almost straight-line increase from the 1960
level of 88.1 million tons; 56% of this waste ends up in landfills (U.S. EPA 2003a). This volume
pales in comparison to the waste generated by industry: According to the Environmental Protection
Agency, “American industrialized facilities generate and dispose of approximately 7.6 billion tons
of industrial solid waste each year” (U.S. EPA 2003b). In 1999, fourteen states had no landfill
capacity left, whereas eight states had less than ten years of landfill capacity left (U.S. EPA 2002).
While recycling is the most prevalent activity in diverting waste from landfills (for example, two
thirds of municipal solid waste that is not landfilled is recycled), the EPA advocates “source reduc-
tion” as the preferred way of reducing the burden on the environment (U.S. EPA 2003a). Source
reduction refers not only to using fewer and less toxic materials in manufacturing a product, but
also to encouraging reuse, “removing a product or component from a retired system and installing
it in another system,” and remanufacturing, “disassembling, inspecting, repairing, replacing, and
reassembling the components of a part or product to like-new condition” (Thorn and Rogerson
2002). Remanufacturing reduces both raw material and energy consumption. On average, for each
pound of new material used in remanufacturing, five to nine pounds are conserved (U.S. EPA 1997).
Remanufacturing auto parts, for example, conserves an estimated 60% of the energy used in making
the original product (U.S. EPA 1997).
It is encouraging that there is a market for remanufactured products in the US. For example, by
1997, approximately 73,000 U.S. firms had sold an estimated $53 billion worth of remanufactured
products (U.S. EPA 1997). Examples of remanufactured products include automotive parts, cranes
and forklifts, furniture, medical equipment, pallets, personal computers, photocopiers, telephones,
televisions, tires and toner cartridges, among others. These products are put on the market by the
Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) and/or independent remanufacturers.
The Xerox Corporation demonstrated early on that remanufacturing can be a very lucrative
prospect (Berko-Boateng et al. 1993). In 1991, they obtained savings of around $200 million by
remanufacturing copiers returned at the expiration of their lease contracts. Kodak is one of the
classic examples of an OEM that has created a fully integrated manufacturing-remanufacturing
strategy around its reusable Funsaver camera line (Toktay et al. 2000). Caterpillar is shifting its
strategy from solely manufacturing and selling construction equipment to a leasing and remanu-
facturing strategy (Gutowski et al. 2001). This allows Caterpillar to create a new market among
contractors who cannot afford to buy a Caterpillar product outright, but instead, lease one when
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needed.
Unfortunately from an environmental standpoint, the companies mentioned above represent the
exception to the rule; most firms do not adopt the remanufacturing option. In many cases, the
choice not to remanufacture is driven by two concerns: cost and internal cannibalization. On the
cost side, the combination of fixed and variable costs may be too high to justify remanufacturing.
However, even if the remanufactured product is independently profitable, firms may ignore this
option due to concerns about cannibalization: If the remanufactured product is sold in the same
market as the new product, it attracts the same customer population. If, in addition, it is priced
lower than the new product, previously captive customers may choose to buy the remanufactured
product instead. Such internal cannibalization is often assumed by firms to be undesirable if
the margin on the new product is higher than the margin on the remanufactured product. The
degree and effect of demand cannibalization depends on the relative positioning of the new and
the remanufactured products, and their relative margins. For this reason, it is important to jointly
determine the prices (called “market segmentation”) of the new and remanufactured products to
optimize profit.
The question of how to position (or even to offer or not) a remanufactured product is not
well understood by the majority of firms today. In the absence of analytical tools to help them,
firms often develop rules of thumb such as to never price a remanufactured product more than
x% of the price of a new product. Bosch Tools division for example, decides what product lines
to remanufacture based upon the product’s price and market share. If the market share is below
a certain threshold and the new product price is above a given threshold, then the product is
remanufactured, otherwise it is not (Valenta 2004).
If the remanufactured product is independently profitable, but the firm chooses not to in-
vest in remanufacturing, independent remanufacturers may enter the market, resulting in external
competition rather than internal cannibalization. The threat of external competition through the
remanufactured product is a major concern for many firms. To respond to this threat, several
strategies are available to the original manufacturer. Two such OEM strategies are (i) entering the
remanufacturing market, or (ii) preemptively collecting its used products. For example, indepen-
dent PC rebuilders abound, taking market share from OEMs, especially on low-budget customers
who do not need the latest technology. In response, companies such as Dell and IBM have started
taking back used computers for remanufacture and sale through their own distribution channels
(Ginsburg 2001). To limit competition from remanufacturers, Lexmark introduced the Prebate
program whereby customers who return an empty printer cartridge obtain a discount on a new car-
tridge; Lexmark does not remanufacture these cartridges, recycling them instead (www.atlex.com
2003). Bosch collects a broader range of products than those it remanufactures (Valenta 2004).
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The choice of recovery strategy in the face of competition remains a challenge in practice. In
this paper, we develop models to support decision making concerning recovery strategies under
external remanufacturing competition. We start by analyzing a monopolist’s pricing decisions
for both its new and remanufactured products. We model the (internal) competition between a
new and remanufactured product explicitly, as a function of prices and the difference in consumer
willingness-to-pay between the products. The variable cost to collect and remanufacture is modelled
as an increasing function of the quantity remanufactured, thus capturing a unique aspect of the
remanufacturing industry that has not been explored in previous market segmentation research.
Our findings provide OEMs with conditions where the cost savings from remanufacturing exceed
the detrimental effect of cannibalization. We then explore the implications of an OEM choosing
not to remanufacture by modelling the impact of external competition on the OEM’s profit if a new
firm enters the market and remanufactures the OEM’s product. We find that an OEM may choose
to remanufacture to deter this entry, even when it would not have chosen to do so under a pure
monopoly environment. There are also cases where it is more profitable for the firm to collect the
used products (cores) but not remanufacture them. In this case, collection is used as a deterrent to
avoid competition from external remanufacturers. Finally, we discuss where one deterrent strategy
is more profitable than the other. In particular, we provide insights to the following questions:
1. To what extent will the remanufactured product cannibalize sales of new products? Should
a firm remanufacture its own product? If yes, how should it price each product?
2. How should the OEM define its recovery strategy if there is a possibility of third-party re-
manufacturing entrants?
3. What are the conditions that favor remanufacturing versus collection as entry-deterrent re-
covery strategies?
4. What is the impact of the fixed and variable costs incurred on recovery strategies?
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we position our research in
the context of the relevant literature. Our key assumptions and notation are outlined in §3. In §4,
we analyze a monopolist manufacturer’s decision concerning whether or not to remanufacture its
own product. In §5, we analyze the impact of remanufacturing competition and the effectiveness
of entry-deterrent recovery strategies. In particular, §5.1 determines the effect on the firm’s profit
if an external entrant remanufactures the firm’s product and sells it in the same market. §5.2
and §5.3 explore remanufacturing and collection as potential entry-deterrent recovery strategies.
We conclude our analysis by comparing these two strategies in §5.4 and discuss when each is
appropriate. In §6, we summarize our results and conclude with managerial implications. All
proofs are provided in Appendix A.
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2 Literature Review
Our research draws on two separate streams of literature: market segmentation and remanufac-
turing. In this section, we provide a review of the prominent research in each stream and position
our research at the point of their intersection. We begin with an overview of the relevant market
segmentation literature.
The literature on market segmentation by a monopoly (Mussa and Rosen 1978, Moorthy 1984)
studies the optimal pricing and placement of independent products that are differentiated by qual-
ity in a market of heterogeneous consumers. The monopolist faces an increasing cost of quality.
Consumers prefer a higher quality to a lower quality but differ in how much they are willing to
pay for the quality. The monopolist chooses the quality level and price for each product. Katz
(1984), Moorthy (1988), and Desai (2001) extend this research stream to allow for external com-
petition. The major differences between the new product market segmentation research and the
remanufacturing problem that we address are: (i) the constraint that the number of remanufac-
tured products must be less than or equal to the number of new products previously produced, (ii)
an exogenous relative consumer willingness-to-pay for a remanufactured versus a new product, and
(iii) an average variable collection and/or processing cost that increases in the quantity of units
collected/processed.
The majority of the existing literature on remanufacturing has focused on operational issues
that arise as a result of the return flows of used products. These issues include disassembly (Guide
and Srivastava 1998), MRP for product recovery (Kokkinaki et al. 2004), production planning (In-
derfurth et al. 2004), scheduling and shop floor control (Guide et al. 1997), inventory management
(Toktay et al. 2000, Minner and Lindner 2004, van der Laan et al. 2004), handling and warehousing
(de Brito and de Koster 2004), forecasting (Toktay et al. 2004), reverse logistics network design
(Fleischmann 2000), and collection and vehicle routing (Beullens et al. 2004). In this stream
of literature, price and demand are assumed to be exogenous, and consumers do not differenti-
ate between new and remanufactured products. The focus is on determining the cost-minimizing
operating policy or system design for a given remanufactured product and its price.
Recently, a number of authors have started exploring market-related issues such as market
segmentation, competition, and collection incentives. Debo et al. (2005) focus on a monopolist
who considers selling both new and remanufactured products to a customer base that has a lower
willingness-to-pay for the remanufactured product. They determine the monopolist’s optimal mar-
ket segmentation and remanufacturability level decisions in an infinite-horizon setting. In a related
paper, Ferguson and Koenigsberg (2005) analyze the stocking and pricing decisions of a monopolist
who sells perishable goods. Unsold product from the first period can be sold in the second period
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along with fresh product, and is valued less by consumers. Conditions are derived for when the
manufacturer should carry over all, some, or none of its leftover product. The market segmentation
model used in these papers is the same as ours, and the constraint on sales of remanufactured or
old products by past production levels is explicitly modelled. In contrast, our focus is on analyzing
and comparing entry-deterrent strategies in the face of potential competition.
Several papers investigate the impact of competition in a remanufacturing setting from various
angles. Groenevelt and Majumder (2001a), and Ferrer and Swaminathan (2005) assume that new
and remanufactured products offered by the OEM are indistinguishable, but that the entrant’s re-
manufactured product is valued less by consumers. Thus, the external competition model in these
papers is one with essentially two products as in ours (apart from the internal OEM decision of how
much of its own demand to satisfy through remanufacturing). In these papers, both firms make
pricing decisions subject to the availability of used products in a two-period model; the proportion
of used products available to each company is exogenously given. In Ferrer and Swaminathan
(2005), the OEM collects a fraction of used products for free, and the rest are available to the com-
petitor. The main focus of this paper is characterizing the Nash equilibrium and investigating the
impact of various parameters. In Groenevelt and Majumder (2001a), the collection and processing
cost is linear in the total quantity collected and processed. Again, a given fraction of used products
is at the disposal of the OEM, and the rest is available to the competitor. The authors consider
four different scenarios depending on whether one party has access to the unused allocation of the
other party. The focus is on characterizing the equilibrium solution and investigating the impact
of various parameters on this solution. Debo et al. (2005), in an extension, assume that a perfectly
competitive remanufactured product market exists, and investigate pricing and remanufacturability
level implications for an OEM who only produces the new product. They find that the remanufac-
turability level provided by the OEM decreases relative to the base case where the OEM controls
the remanufactured product market. Savaşkan and Van Wassenhove (2005) discuss the impact of
remanufacturing on competing retail stores.
Several other papers separately address collection issues. Savaşkan et al. (2004) determine
the optimal collection channel configuration of a monopolist manufacturer. Galbreth and Black-
burn (2005) model the number of cores to collect as a parameter in the overall remanufacturing
cost minimization problem. Groenevelt and Majumder (2001b) consider a manufacturer and an
independent remanufacturer who are price takers in the product market (perfect competition), but
who compete on procurement of used products. Motivated by an example from the cellular phone
industry, Guide et al. (2003) determine the optimal quality-dependent take-back price schedule
for a remanufacturer. Finally, Ray et al. (2005) study the use of trade-in rebates to encourage
the customer’s replacement of a product and to provide the firm with additional revenues through
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remanufacturing/reuse operations. These papers reinforce the notion that the average variable
cost of collection/remanufacturing increases with the number of units collected/remanufactured.
In our analysis, we assume that the average variable remanufacturing cost increases in the volume
remanufactured. We further assume that the original manufacturer has a first mover advantage in
terms of access to collecting the used products.
Our results complement the two streams of literature on competition and collection in a re-
manufacturing setting by investigating the effectiveness of remanufacturing and collection as entry-
deterrent strategies, and discuss under what conditions each strategy is preferable. From a mod-
elling perspective, one of our contributions is that we incorporate a variable collection and/or
processing cost that increases in volume, thus linking our competition models with the procure-
ment models of Groenevelt and Majumder (2001b), Guide et al. (2003), Ray et al. (2005), and
Galbreth and Blackburn (2005). We also incorporate fixed costs for collection and remanufacturing,
which play an important role in the analysis of entry deterrence.
3 Key Assumptions and Notation
Before presenting our model, we state and discuss key assumptions specific to our remanufacturing
environment. We refer to the firm that originally manufactures the product as the OEM and the
firm that remanufactures a product that was originally produced by the OEM as the entrant.
Assumption 1. Key problem dynamics are captured in a two-period model.
We develop a two-period model with a single-firm, single-product setting in the first period and
potential competition in the second period. The competition in the second period (internal or ex-
ternal) is due to product that was sold new in the first period, and is now sold as a remanufactured
product. Our objective is two-fold. First, we study how the presence of competition from remanu-
factured units affects the OEM’s new product pricing decisions and its recovery strategy, captured
through our second-period analysis. Second, we study how the possibility of remanufacturing in
the future affects the OEM’s pricing decisions in the present, captured in our first-period analysis.
Thus, a two-period model is sufficient and allows us to maintain tractability. Other papers that
use a two-period model in a remanufacturing setting include Groenevelt and Majumder (2001a),
Ferrer and Swaminathan (2005), and Ray et al. (2005).
Assumption 2. The product has a useful lifetime of only one period.
We assume that the product has a useful lifetime of only one period although it may be re-
manufactured after the first period and provide positive utility for some customers in the second
period. This assumption is appropriate as long as periods are chosen of sufficient length for the
product being analyzed. Because without remanufacturing it, a product bought in the first period
6
cannot be used in the second period, used products are returned at the end of the first period.
Thus, customer purchase decisions are independent across periods.
Assumption 3. Each consumer’s willingness-to-pay for a remanufactured product is a fraction δ
of their willingness-to pay for the new product.
This assumption gives rise to a vertical differentiation model where consumers’ valuation for
a product characteristic (typically referred to as ‘product quality’) has an agreed order, i.e. all
consumers prefer a higher quality product to a lower quality product (Tirole 1988). Note that if
δ = 0, consumers are not willing to pay anything for the remanufactured product; this eliminates
the option of remanufacturing and selling used products. If δ = 1, consumers view the new and
remanufactured units as being identical and are willing to pay the same amount for either product.
Most products fall between the two extremes; we assume 0 < δ < 1.
The reason for the lower relative willingness-to-pay is either due to customer concerns about
quality or because of a ‘fair price’ perspective - if it costs less for the manufacturer to remanufacture
the product than to make it, the customer wants that reflected in the price. The first perspective
is reflected in the title of the Computer World article (Kandra 2002) – “Refurbished PCs: Sweet
Deals or Lemons?” In the tire industry, retreads are perceived to have lower quality than new
tires (Préjean 1989). These types of fears are typically unfounded; most remanufactured products
perform on par with new products. In fact, some products sold as ‘remanufactured’ are just
commercial returns without any performance problems that are put on the market again after
some testing (Guide and Van Wassenhove 2002). However, there are also cases where there may
be quality problems, especially when independent remanufacturers are in question (Johnson 2001).
In our model, we assume the products to be of equal quality; the lower willingness-to-pay is due
only to consumer perception.
The implication of the customer’s lower willingness-to-pay is that even a product of the same
specification and warranty as the new product may need to be priced lower to attract customers.
Indeed, processed PCs are typically priced at 10-30% below the price of a comparable new system
(Kandra 2002). Lund and Skeels (1983) also note that the price at which remanufactured auto-
motive components can competitively sell for is 57% of the new item price. We assume that the
relative willingness-to-pay is given. There may be cases where the OEM can influence the ‘per-
ceived’ quality of the remanufactured product through a judicious choice of packaging, warranties,
marketing, etc. Our assumption can be interpreted as the firm having chosen to operate under an
existing bias, possibly achieved as a result of prior advertising.
Assumption 4. Consumer willingness-to-pay is heterogeneous and uniformly distributed in the
interval [0, 1].
We assume that consumers’ willingness-to-pay (valuations) are distributed uniformly in the
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interval [0, 1] and that in any period, each consumer uses at most one unit. The market size is
normalized to 1. In this vertical differentiation model, a consumer of type φ ∈ [0, 1] has a valuation
of φ for a new product and δφ for a remanufactured product. The utility that each consumer
derives from purchasing a product is given by the difference of their valuation and the price.
Let q1 denote the first-period demand for new products, and q2n and q2r denote the second-
period demand for new and remanufactured products, respectively. We derive the demand functions
from consumers’ utility functions (Appendix B). This construction leads to the following linear
inverse demand functions:
p1 = 1 − q1 (1)
for the first period (since there are no remanufactured units available to sell in the first period,
there is only one inverse demand function) and
p2n = 1 − q2n − δq2r (2)
p2r = δ(1 − q2n − q2r) (3)
for the second period. The latter functions capture the competition between the remanufactured
product and the new product. Note that the relative willingness-to-pay has a different effect on
the prices of the new and the remanufactured units (for given quantity levels). As this parameter
increases, the price of the remanufactured product increases to take advantage of the increased
willingness-to-pay. However, as this parameter increases, the price of the new product decreases
as the two products become closer substitutes and there is more competition (the cannibalization
effect).
Assumption 5. The variable cost of collection and/or processing increases in the quantity of the
products collected/processed.
Since this assumption is a departure from previous literature, it deserves an extended explana-
tion. For most firms, remanufacturing an item typically involves two steps. First, the used cores
must be collected, inspected and sorted from the best to worst condition upon arrival; and second,
a subset of the number of cores collected are processed (testing, cleaning, and replacing of parts)
in the order of their decreasing arrival conditions. Thus, a decision to remanufacture x units in-
volves an optimization problem where the firm chooses the number of units y : y ≥ x to collect,
with only a proportion, 0 ≤ x/y ≤ 1, of these units being processed. Suppose the total variable
cost of collecting y units is hc(y) and the total variable cost of processing x of those y units is
hp(x, y). Combining these two variable costs results in an optimization problem where the optimal
y is chosen such that the combined total variable cost to remanufacture x units is minimized:
Γ(x) = min
x≤y≤γq1
[hc(y) + hp(x, y)] . (4)
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The first constraint on y ensures that a sufficient number of cores are collected (x ≤ y). The second
constraint (y ≤ γq1) places a limit on the number of cores that can be collected based on the
first-period production quantity: We assume that at the beginning of the second period, at most
γq1 cores can be collected. The parameter γ captures the fact that not all products can be obtained
at the end of their useful lifetime. For example, the return rate for Kodak single-use cameras was
less than 60%.
We do not explicitly model the optimization problem (4); the reader is referred to Galbreth
and Blackburn (2005) for a thorough treatment of this problem. Instead, let Γ(x) represent the
minimum total variable cost to remanufacture x units (found by solving (4) for the optimal number
of cores to collect, y∗). Γ(x) is convex increasing in the quantity remanufactured if either the
variable collection cost is convex increasing in the collection quantity or the processing cost is
convex increasing in the processing quantity, with neither cost being concave decreasing.
There are many cases where the collection cost is convex increasing in quantity. Transportation
cost often increases in the number of cores collected since the firm loses economies of scale as
it moves from collecting cores in densely populated areas to collecting cores in more rural areas.
Agnihotri et al. (1990) describe a refuse collection facility where the cost of collecting is convex
increasing in the amount collected. The acquisition cost for the cores may also increase in the
number of units as consumers have heterogeneous reservation prices for what it takes to convince
them to return their used products. This cost is modelled explicitly in Ray et al. (2005) through
the use of trade-in rebates.
Many firms also experience a convex increasing processing cost due to the variance in condition
of the returned cores and the fact that the firms process the cores in the best condition (upon arrival)
first. The concept of a high variance in the condition of returned products has been identified in
several studies (Klausner and Hendrickson 2000, Guide and Van Wassenhove 2001, Guide et al.
2003, and de Brito and de Koster 2004). Ferguson et al. (2004) provide an example where 80% of
HP’s inkjet printer returns required no significant processing besides cleaning and repackaging. For
this reason, most firms sort their returned units and only process a percentage of the total returns
with the highest quality. An alternative situation, modelled in Guide et al. (2003), is where the
firm pays higher prices for higher quality product returns. Under either of these strategies, the
total variable cost of processing is convex increasing in quantity.
For our analysis, we approximate the function Γ(x) with hxλ, where h and λ are found from a








When Γ(x) is convex increasing, which is the focus of this paper, λ > 1 will be obtained. As
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explained later, our quantitative results are obtained for the special case λ = 2. Our qualitative
results however, generalize to the less restricted case of λ > 1.
We offer one possible representation of the total variable collection and processing cost as
follows: hc(y) = hcy





. For α > 1, the total variable collection cost is
convex increasing in the quantity collected. The special case of α = 1 results in a linear collection
cost of hcy. For β > 0, the total variable processing cost is convex increasing in the quantity
processed. The special case of β = 0 results in a linear processing cost of hpx. In this representation,
our assumption of a convex increasing total variable remanufacturing cost, λ > 1, holds if either
(α > 1, β ≥ 0) or (α ≥ 1, β > 0). Thus, our assumption holds if either the variable collection or
processing cost is convex increasing in the quantity and the other is not concave decreasing. From
our experience, it is rare that at least one of these costs are not convex increasing in quantity.
Assumption 6. A firm choosing to remanufacture faces a fixed cost F consisting of two com-
ponents. The first component, Fc, is the cost of setting up the collection system and the second
component, Fp, is the cost of setting up the processing operation.
We assume that all firms are profit seeking so a firm will not remanufacture if its incremental
profit from doing so is below the total fixed cost F = Fc + Fp.
Based on the assumptions described above, we introduce the remainder of our notation and
describe the model. The OEM can produce new units at a price of c each. The unit cost c must
satisfy c < 1, since 1 is the maximum willingness-to-pay of consumers for a new product. If this
condition were not satisfied, the firm could not profitably manufacture the new product in the first
place. We summarize the model’s parameters and decision variables in Table 1.
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First Period Second Period
Symbol Definition Symbol Definition
Parameters c Cost to produce 1 new product c Cost to produce the 1 new product
δ Relative willingness-to-pay
γ Fraction of q1 that can be collected
hxλ Total variable cost to remanf x units
Decision vars p1 Price of new products p2n Price of new products
q1 New products produced q2n New products produced
p2r Price of remanufactured products
q2r Number of products remanufactured
Fc Fixed cost of collection
Fp Fixed cost of processing
F = Fc + Fr
Table 1: Parameters and Variables
4 Monopolist’s Strategy in the Absence of Remanufacturing Com-
petition
In this section, we answer the question: “Should a monopolist remanufacture its own product and,
if so, how should the remanufactured product be priced in relation to the firm’s existing product?”
In our setting, a monopolist refers to an OEM that is not under an immediate threat of an entrant
offering a remanufactured version of its product. Devoid of this external competition, a monopolist
OEM may still decide to recover and remanufacture its product. In doing so however, the reman-
ufactured offering will cannibalize sales of the OEM’s new product. Thus, we model this internal
competition to obtain conditions where it is profitable for an OEM to offer both its new product and
its remanufactured product in the same market. This is similar to the internal competition models
of Debo et al. (2005) and Ferguson and Koenigsberg (2005) with one important difference: In this
model, the average variable cost to remanufacture is a function of the volume remanufactured. The
results of this section will form the basis for the analysis in later sections concerning OEM strategies
under the threat of competitive entry. In §4.1 and §4.2, we calculate optimal OEM profits without
and with remanufacturing, respectively. These profits are compared in §4.3 to determine the mo-
nopolist OEM’s optimal strategy in the absence of remanufacturing competition. In our analysis,
we assume the special case of a quadratic total variable remanufacturing cost (λ = 2). This is done
for illustrative purposes as it allows for closed form expressions of the decision variables and the
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corresponding threshold values where the firm’s strategy may change. All of our qualitative results
hold for any convex increasing variable cost (λ > 1) as the structure of the solutions remain the
same.
4.1 OEM Profits without Remanufacturing
With no remanufacturing, the two periods are independent and identical. The OEM’s objective in
the first period is
Maxq̃1(p̃1 − c)q̃1,
which is concave in q̃1 (tilde denotes the “no remanufacturing” case). Checking first-order conditions











With no competition from a remanufactured product in the second period, the second period





4.2 OEM Profits with Remanufacturing
We now model the scenario where the OEM remanufactures and sells the remanufactured units in
the same market as its new units in the second period. We remove the tilde from our notation to
distinguish this case from the “no remanufacturing” case. Since the OEM’s second-period decisions
are dependent upon the amount sold in the first period, we solve the problem in two stages, starting
with the second period.
Second-Period Analysis. The OEM starts the second period with the opportunity to recover
γq1 cores from product that was sold in the first period. In addition to the new product quantity
q2n, the OEM also chooses the number of units to remanufacture, q2r. With two products on the
market, the inverse demand functions are given by (2) and (3). The OEM’s second period objective
is
Maxq2n,q2r Π2(q2n, q2r|q1) = (p2n − c)q2n + (p2r − hq2r)q2r
s.t. q2r ≤ γq1.
First, let us assume that F = 0 and find the optimal solution. A positive fixed cost will be added




. Since 0 < δ < 1, q̄ > 0.
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We observe a threshold level on h that determines the OEM product portfolio choice. When h
is low (Condition 2), remanufacturing is very attractive: The OEM prefers to sell only the reman-
ufactured product in the second period, and offers the new product only because it is restricted in
its supply of used products to remanufacture. When h is high (Condition 1), remanufacturing is
less attractive and the OEM prefers to sell both products. There is a threshold q̄ on the availability
of cores below which q∗2r is constrained and all available cores γq1 are remanufactured. In this case,
the remanufactured product price depends on the supply of cores. Since in practice, the second
condition (where the OEM prefers to sell only the remanufactured product) is not prevalent, we
focus on Condition 1 for the remainder of our analysis: We assume that h > δ(c−1+δ)1−c . Note that
if δ ≤ 1 − c, then this is the only case possible, as the condition defining the case holds for any
positive h.
Remark If F = 0, then remanufacturing in the second period is always more profitable than not
remanufacturing.
The optimal solution q∗2r is always positive, as observed in Proposition 1. Thus, if there were no
fixed cost associated with remanufacturing used products, then remanufacturing would be under-
taken by the manufacturer for any level of q1. On the other hand, with a fixed cost F , the profit
differential between the remanufacturing and no remanufacturing strategies needs to exceed F for
the firm to consider remanufacturing, i.e. Π∗2(q1) −
(1−c)2
4 > F must hold. This result is driven
by our assumption of a convex-increasing total variable remanufacturing cost and the fact that we
model the number of products as a continuous variable. If the total variable cost is linear in the
number of products remanufactured, there exists a threshold on h above which the OEM would
not remanufacture even when F = 0 (see Ferguson and Koenigsberg 2005 for details).
First Period Analysis. After characterizing the OEM’s optimal second-period decisions given
q1, we now solve for the optimal first-period quantity decision. We maximize the total two-period
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profit Π(q1) = (p1 − c)q1 + Π
∗




Proposition 2 Let F = 0. If h < h̃
.












. If h ≥ h̃, then
q∗1 =
1−c








Note that if h is high, the first period production quantity is the same as in the monopoly case,
and this quantity is sufficient to attain the optimal unconstrained product mix in the second period.
When h is low, and remanufacturing is attractive, the first period production quantity exceeds the
monopoly quantity; this is to benefit from the future remanufacturing potential of these sales.
4.3 Monopolist’s Optimal Strategy
The analysis so far assumed F = 0. We now introduce a fixed cost F and determine the optimal
strategy for the OEM - whether to only sell new products or to also remanufacture.
Proposition 3 There exists a threshold level h̄ for the cost of the remanufactured product above
which the OEM only sells the new product.
Proposition 3 states that a threshold h̄ exists, above which the monopolist OEM chooses not to
remanufacture and sells only new product in the second period. Even though the incremental profit
from remanufacturing is positive before fixed costs are accounted for, this profit does not make up
for the fixed costs needed to establish the remanufacturing operation. The following numerical
example illustrates a case where the OEM decides (in the absence of external competition) not to
remanufacture in the second period.
Example 1. Let c = .10, h = .005, δ = .8, λ = 2, γ = 1 and F = .02. The fixed cost is small
because we have normalized our market size to one and the fixed cost needs to be of the same order of
magnitude to be meaningful. If the OEM does not remanufacture, its profit is Π̃∗ = (1−c)
2
2 = 0.405.
If the OEM does remanufacture, its optimal profit is calculated from the second case in Proposition




2 −F = 0.395. Since Π̃
∗ > Π∗, we conclude that it is not
optimal for the OEM to remanufacture.
5 OEM’s Strategies under the Threat of an Entrant
There are many situations where the conditions for remanufacturing are not attractive for the
OEM (due to the cannibalization effect), but they are attractive for independent remanufacturers.
Indeed, many products are remanufactured and sold by companies who do not produce the original
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product. Such an entrant creates a competitive environment by capturing sales from the original
OEM’s customer base.
In this section, we focus on situations where h exceeds the threshold given by Proposition
3 such that a monopolist OEM would choose not to remanufacture, thus opening itself to the
threat of competition by a third-party remanufacturer (the ‘entrant’). In this context, we answer
the question: “How does the potential entrance of a third-party remanufacturer in the second
period affect the OEM’s recovery strategy?” In particular, we consider two strategies: The OEM
remanufactures to deter entry and the OEM collects cores to preempt entry. While there may
be other strategies available to the OEM, these two are prevalent strategies, and demonstrate
the usefulness of our models. We start by characterizing the second-period Nash equilibrium and
calculating OEM profits when an entrant decides to remanufacture the OEM’s product (§5.1), then
demonstrate the potential profit loss incurred by the OEM as a result of not having invested in
recovery. In §5.2 and §5.3, we propose two possible preemptive strategies and discusses conditions
under which each strategy is more profitable in §5.4.
5.1 OEM’s Profit when the Entrant Remanufactures
Let p̄2r, q̄2r and Π̄2 represent the entrant’s second-period remanufactured product price, quantity
and profit, respectively. The OEM only makes decisions concerning the new product. The OEM’s
second-period objective given the entrant’s choice of q̄2r is
Maxq2n Π2(q2n|q̄2r) = (p2n − c)q2n = (1 − q2n − δq̄2r − c)q2n. (7)
The entrant enters the second period with the opportunity to recover γq1 cores from product that
was sold in the first period and faces competition from the OEM’s new product. The entrant’s
objective given the OEM’s choice of q2n is
Maxq̄2r Π̄2(q̄2r|q2n, q1) = (p̄2r − hq̄2r)q̄2r − F = (δ − δq2n − δq̄2r − hq̄2r)q̄2r − F (8)
s.t. q̄2r ≤ γq1.
Let the superscript n represent the Nash equilibrium in the second period. In the first period,
the OEM strategically determines the production quantity in anticipation of the second period
interaction; call this value qn1 .




represent the threshold level where the entrant is constrained
by the availability of the cores. qn1 maximizes the total two-period profits Π1(q1) + Π2(q1) where









otherwise. The second period equilibrium production quantities and the entrant’s profit are:
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* If γqn1 ≤ q̃ the entrant is constrained by the first period production quantity and the Nash
















2 − F .
* If γqn1 ≥ q̃ the entrant is not constrained and the Nash equilibrium for the second period pro-














As proven in Proposition 3, there is a threshold value of h above which the monopolist OEM
would prefer to not remanufacture. The solid lines in Figure 1 plot this threshold as a function of F
for different values of c and δ; above the solid line, the monopolist OEM would not remanufacture.
However, this leaves the door open to a potential entrant to remanufacture cores and compete with
the OEM. Using the equilibrium profit expression for the entrant from Proposition 4, we can find a
similar threshold for h where the entrant is indifferent between entering the remanufactured product
market or not. These thresholds, as functions of F , are represented by dashed lines in Figure 1 for
different values of c and δ; below the dashed line, the entrant profitably remanufactures the OEM’s
cores. As either the manufacturing cost or the relative willingness-to-pay increases, remanufacturing
becomes a more attractive option for both parties, and the indifference curves shift accordingly.
The area between each pair of OEM and entrant indifference curves is where the monopolist OEM
would choose not to remanufacture, but an entrant would find it profitable to do so, detracting
from OEM profits. The following example illustrates such a case, using the same parameter values
as Example 1.
Example 2. The OEM’s first-period production quantity is qn1 = 0.45. In this case q̃ = 0.34,
so γqn1 ≥ q̃ and the entrant is not constrained by the availability of cores. Since the entrant only





−F = .074. The OEM’s profit (under






= 0.099, and its two-
period profit is Π∗,n = (1−c)
2
4 + .099 = 0.301. Comparing to Example 1, we observe that the OEM is
significantly worse off with external competition. Note that 0.45 is also the monopoly production
quantity in period 1. Although the OEM acts strategically in period 1, and may set qn1 < q
∗
1, he
does not do so in this case. This is because the OEM would need to reduce first period production
by a large amount (and lose significant revenue) before he can affect the quantity the entrant will
remanufacture in the second period.
Since competitor entry is detrimental to OEM profits, we next focus on two preemptive strategies
designed to discourage an external firm from remanufacturing the OEM’s product: remanufacturing
and collection.
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Figure 1: Pairs of OEM (solid line) and entrant (dashed line) indifference curves as a function of h
and F . For each pair, in the region between the solid line and the dashed line, a monopolist OEM
would not remanufacture, but an entrant would find it profitable to remanufacture.
5.2 Strategies to Discourage Competition: OEM Remanufactures to Preempt
Entry
In our analysis, we assume that a third-party remanufacturer will only consider entering the market
if the OEM decides not to remanufacture itself. Thus, we allow at most one firm to remanufacture
in the second period; the OEM always sells the new product. This assumption is reasonable when
the OEM enjoys a brand advantage for its remanufactured product over the entrant’s product or
the OEM enjoys a first-mover advantage in the recovery of the cores needed for remanufacturing.
With a brand advantage, the OEM’s offering of both a new and a remanufactured product will
leave little room for an entrant to sell a product of a perceived lower quality than either of the two
offerings of the OEM. If the entrant faces the same remanufacturing cost structure as the OEM, it
is only under very rare conditions that the remaining market size (not covered by the OEM’s new
and remanufactured products) is large enough for the entrant to make enough positive profit to
cover its fixed cost. Both Groenevelt and Majumder (2001a) and Ferrer and Swaminathan (2005),
discuss situations where the OEM enjoys a brand advantage over the entrant that makes it difficult
for the entrant to compete when the OEM decides to remanufacture its product.
With a first-mover advantage, remanufacturing can again be an attractive preemptive strategy.
When the OEM has a first-mover advantage, the OEM essentially collects the cores that are the
most readily available, thus making it much more expensive for the entrant to remanufacture relative
to the OEM. There are many situations where the OEM enjoys such a first-mover advantage. In
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general, OEMs already have a relationship with their customers as well as some knowledge about
when the product will need to be replaced. OEMs that sell capital goods often also sell maintenance
contracts, giving them a clear advantage for recovering the cores once a component or product has
expired. Auto manufacturers have a network of dealers that perform regular maintenance on their
products, providing them with easy access to the replaced parts. Printer manufacturers sometimes
provide postage paid shipping bags with their products so the used printer cartridges can be easily
returned and many providers of such items as car batteries and tires provide discounts (sometimes
mandated by regulation) if the old product is returned when the new product is purchased.
Assuming one of the assumptions above holds, under most conditions the entrant will not find
it profitable to offer a remanufactured product in competition with the OEM’s remanufactured
product. Thus, the OEM may choose to remanufacture for the sole purpose of discouraging an
external firm from doing so. The following example (using the same parameter values as Examples 1
and 2) shows that the OEM may choose to remanufacture its product under the threat of competitor
entry although it would not do so in a monopoly setting. In the absence of at least one of the
conditions described above, however, remanufacturing is less desirable as a preemptive strategy.
Example 3. From Example 2, the OEM’s total profit under external competition is Π∗,n =
0.301. From Example 1, if the OEM remanufactures, it makes Π∗ = 0.395, if it doesn’t, it makes
Π̃∗ = 0.405. Thus, even though it is not profit maximizing in this case for the OEM to choose to
remanufacture in the absence of external competition since Π̃∗ > Π∗, it is rational for it to do so
to preempt entry by a competitor since Π∗ > Π∗,n.
5.3 Strategies to Discourage Competition: OEM Collects Cores but Does Not
Remanufacture
The OEM may choose a second strategy to deter entry – collecting a portion, or all, of the used
products and disposing or recycling them to limit or prevent remanufacturing by the entrant.
There are many examples of companies employing policies meant to recover their product’s cores
to prevent them from being remanufactured by potential competitors. For example, Lexmark offers
a rebate to customers who return their used cartridge, but does not refill it, recycling it instead
(www.atlex.com 2003). Bosch collects a broader range of products than those it remanufactures
(Valenta 2004). Volkswagen charges an 80% premium on the cost of a replacement engine if the
old engine is not returned (Inderfurth and Langella 2003).
To recover the cores, the OEM only incurs the fixed collection cost Fc, Fc ≤ F and collection
cost hc, hc ≤ h since it does not use the cores for remanufacturing. The purpose of collection under
this scenario is purely strategic; it limits or completely eliminates competition from the entrant. We
assume that the OEM has better access to the owners of the cores (as discussed in §5.2) and thus
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can obtain the cores at the lower end of the convex increasing cost curve. Another way of saying this
is that the OEM has the first choice on what cores to collect and chooses the cores with the lowest
collection cost. Thus, if the OEM collects the first y cores, the entrant’s variable remanufacturing
cost does not start at zero as in the original case but rather at hy (for the quadratic cost case).
Therefore, by collecting cores, the OEM not only reduces the supply available to the entrant, but
also makes the operation more expensive.
An OEM following a collection strategy decides on qc, the number of cores to collect but not
to process. If enough cores are left that the operation is profitable for the entrant, the entrant
will remanufacture; collection does not preclude entry since the OEM does not remanufacture. To
understand the OEM’s decision, consider a scenario with no fixed cost. In this case, the OEM’s
optimal collection strategy is to collect part or all of the existing supply. The former decision
will be taken when the cost of collecting more cores exceeds the savings obtained by avoiding the
cannibalization of the new product; the latter decision will be taken when complete collection is
more cost effective than incurring revenue loss due to cannibalization. With a fixed cost for the
entrant, the OEM never collects all the cores, at most, the OEM collects up to the point where
the profit from remanufacturing the remaining cores does not cover the fixed cost of the entrant’s
operation.
The following example (using the same parameter values as in the previous three examples)
shows that the OEM may deter entry by recovering some of the cores sold in the first period.
Example 4. Let hc(y) = hcy
2 = .001y2 and Fc = .005. Then q
∗
c = 0.401. The OEM does not
collect all the cores, but the amount it collects is enough to deter the entrant from collecting and
remanufacturing its cores. The OEM profit in the second period after accounting for the fixed and
variable cost of collection is 0.1971, giving a total two-period profit of 0.400. Comparing this with
a total profit of 0.395 when using remanufacturing as a deterrent, we see that the OEM is better
off using a collection strategy. If the fixed cost of collection were the dominant factor, the result
would be reversed. For example, if Fc = 0.015, then the OEM’s two-period profit is 0.390 in the
collection strategy, but the profit under the remanufacturing strategy is unchanged since F = 0.02
still holds, so remanufacturing is preferable as an entry-deterrent strategy.
The OEM may not always enjoy a first mover advantage in the collection of the cores. For
example, local remanufacturers may be able to access used products more easily due to geographic
proximity. In this case, the effectiveness of collection as an entry-deterrent strategy decreases.
Another factor that may reduce the effectiveness of the collection strategy is a disposal cost charged
against units collected but not processed. In Europe, for example, there is legislation imposing a
recycling cost for such a case. In Appendix C, we discuss the ramifications of a disposal cost.
The collection strategy demonstrates the importance of accurately modelling the shape of the
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variable collection cost curve as a function of the quantity collected. If the cost increases linearly in
the quantity, the collection strategy becomes less attractive. In particular, when the cost is convex
increasing, even in the absence of a fixed cost for the entrant, it is possible for the OEM to deter
entry without collecting all the cores. With a linear cost structure, this is not possible since the
cost of collecting and processing each additional unit is equal, and the OEM is unable to impact
the economic viability of the cores available to the entrant; its only lever is to limit the available
quantity. Thus, inaccurately using a linear collection cost would result in collection being deemed
to be a less effective entry-deterrent strategy than it may truly be. In summary, the conditions
that are favorable to using a collection strategy to deter entry are when the OEM enjoys a first
mover advantage in the collection of the cores needed for remanufacturing and the total variable
collection cost is convex increasing in the quantity of cores collected.
5.4 Which Entry-Deterring Strategy should the OEM Adopt?
Example 4 demonstrates that there are conditions under which the remanufacturing strategy dom-
inates the collection strategy and vice versa. In this section, we explore these conditions more
fully. In particular, we ask the following questions: “What is the impact of collection costs on the
preferred strategy? How do consumer willingness-to-pay and unit manufacturing cost impact the
preferred strategy?” We make three observations.
Observation 1. For a given level of h and F, a lower collection cost, either due to the variable
component hc or the fixed component Fc, increases the relative profitability of the collection strategy.
The reason for this result can be explained as follows: First, with F fixed, it is obvious that
a reduction in Fc would increase OEM profit in the collection strategy but not change it in the
remanufacturing strategy since F is the relevant cost in the latter strategy. Now consider a reduction
in hc, keeping everything else constant. Again, the OEM’s profit in the remanufacturing strategy
would not change. First, suppose that the optimal solution is to collect enough to completely
exclude the entrant from the market. As hc decreases, this is still optimal and the amount that
the OEM needs to collect to deter entry is independent of hc and Fc since entrant profits are a
function of h and F . The OEM’s profit before collection cost is also independent of these values.
Thus, the total OEM profit in the collection strategy monotonically increases as hc decreases. Now,
suppose that the optimal solution leaves enough cores for the entrant to enter the remanufactured
product market. As hc decreases, the amount collected increases, the amount remanufactured by
the entrant decreases, and that manufactured by the OEM increases, leading to a net increase in
OEM profit. This observation provides a basis for categorizing products with respect to whether
remanufacturing or collection is the better strategy by looking at the relative variable cost of
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collection versus remanufacturing. A product for which collection may be preferred by the OEM
is the print cartridge. Since cartridges are often collected by including a prepaid envelope in the
new cartridge packaging, the OEM avoids the fixed cost of establishing a sophisticated reverse-flow
logistics network. The Lexmark Prebate program is such an example.
Observation 2. As the unit manufacturing cost increases, the relative profitability of the reman-
ufacturing strategy increases.
The intuition is the following: The unit manufacturing cost influences only the OEM directly.
As the unit manufacturing cost increases, making profits from the remanufactured product rather
than the new product (as the OEM would under a collection strategy) becomes more attractive
since the margin on the new product erodes. In other words, for a low-margin product that is
relatively cheap to remanufacture, it may be desirable for the OEM to set up a remanufacturing
operation not only to benefit from the residual value in the product but also to preempt entry by
third parties into the lucrative remanufacturing market. This is the case, for example, with copiers
and automotive parts.
Observation 3. As relative willingness-to-pay δ increases, the relative profitability of the reman-
ufacturing strategy increases.
The reason for this result is the following: An increase in the relative willingness-to-pay ad-
vantages any party that undertakes remanufacturing. Thus, the collection effort that the OEM
must expend to limit or completely deter the entrant increases in δ since the entrant’s profitability
increases. This decreases the profitability of the collection strategy. At the same time, the profit
that the OEM can make from remanufacturing increases, enhancing the profitability of the remanu-
facturing strategy. Combining the two effects, we conclude that an increased willingness-to-pay for
the remanufactured product favors remanufacturing as an entry-deterrent strategy. Thus, market
acceptance of the remanufactured product increases the legitimacy of a remanufacturing strategy:
Remanufacturing becomes more profitable both in its own right and as an entry-deterrent strategy.
In many industries, commercial buyers are more knowledgeable about the high relative quality
of remanufactured products than are consumer buyers. Thus, tire manufacturers offer retreaded
tires in their commercial fleet product line but not in their consumer product line, even though
there is little difference in the true relative quality levels of the retreaded versus new tires in either
line. Bosch Power Tools also follows this strategy by focusing their remanufacturing efforts on the
products that are typically purchased by professional contractors. Since the relative willingness-
to-pay of the customer is higher if a warranty is offered, we expect to see warranties to go hand in
hand with remanufacturing, as with retreaded tires and Bosch Power Tools.
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In making this observation, we assumed that consumers value the remanufactured product the
same, regardless of whether it is produced by the OEM or the remanufacturer. For some products,
consumer confidence in the original manufacturer may be higher. In this case, remanufacturing the
OEMs product will be less attractive for an entrant. Thus, an OEM who chooses not to remanu-
facture will be less likely to have its sales cannibalized. Furthermore, deterring the remanufacturer
from entering the market will be easier for the OEM. In particular, the collection strategy will be
more effective over a larger set of conditions.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop insights for managers who face potential competition from firms reman-
ufacturing their used products, and who wish to deter entry using the most cost-effective strategy.
Motivated by examples from industry, we focus on remanufacturing and collection as two potential
entry-deterrent recovery strategies. Our model captures some of the key elements driving the choice
of recovery strategy; in particular, we focus on market characteristics and cost drivers. We consider
a market where a remanufactured product is valued less than a new product and is targeted to the
lower end of the market. Remanufactured product volume is constrained by past sales of the new
product and fixed costs are incurred to set up the collection and remanufacturing operations. The
average variable cost of remanufacturing increases in the quantity remanufactured; this assump-
tion captures a unique aspect of remanufacturing that has not been explored in previous research.
Motivated by practice, we also assume that the OEM has easier access to used products and can
drive up the effective cost of collection and remanufacturing for the entrant through collection.
Two concerns typically drive the OEM’s choice of whether to remanufacture its product: cost
and cannibalization. Even if the remanufactured product is independently profitable, firms may
ignore this option due to concerns about cannibalization. The decision not to remanufacture in this
situation is often made in ignorance, as OEMs lack models to guide them on the financial impact
and strategic implications of their decision. Our findings provide OEMs with conditions where the
benefits of remanufacturing exceed the detrimental effect of cannibalization.
We also explore the implications of an OEM’s decision not to remanufacture. A misconception of
some managers is that if remanufacturing is not profitable for the OEM, it is also not profitable for
an external firm. We demonstrate the fallacy in this perception by showing that there is a significant
range of fixed and variable remanufacturing costs where, even though a monopolist OEM would
not find it more profitable to remanufacture, an independent entrant would make profits doing
so. In other words, the entrant can profitably remanufacture under conditions where the OEM
would prefer not to, despite the fact that the two share the same cost structure. For example, for
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a given variable cost of remanufacturing, the entrant will find it profitable to remanufacture for a
much larger range of fixed costs. This result is driven by the cannibalization of the OEM’s new
product by its remanufactured product. Because of this cannibalization effect, the OEM incurs an
opportunity cost when selling remanufactured products that the entrant does not, since the entrant
has no other competing product. When this opportunity cost is factored in, the profitability hurdle
for the remanufactured product is much higher from the OEM’s perspective. If guided only by
profits, ignoring the threat of competition, the OEM may choose not to remanufacture, but the
consequence may be a significant profit drop if an entrant decides to remanufacture its product. We
conclude that the choice to remanufacture should be considered as part of an OEM’s competitive
strategy.
There are other strategies available to OEMs who wish to deter the entry of a third-party reman-
ufacturer. Total remanufacturing cost is a combination of the cost for collecting the used product
and the cost to bring the product back up to its original quality level. Some OEMs deter entry by
only incurring the cost of collecting their used product, with no intention of remanufacturing it,
simply to increase the cost of a potential remanufacturing competitor. The choice of which strategy
to choose to deter competition depends on many interrelated factors. The literature to date has
analyzed competition and collection in a remanufacturing setting from different angles, but has not
evaluated remanufacturing and collection as potential entry-deterrent mechanisms. Our research
provides guidance for when an OEM should choose a remanufacturing strategy over a collection
strategy or vice versa. Our key results are summarized below.
First, we find that when collection is the major portion of the total remanufacturing fixed
and/or variable cost, the OEM is better off remanufacturing. This observation provides a basis for
categorizing products with respect to whether remanufacturing or collection is the better strategy
by looking at the relative cost of collection versus processing. Second, we find that as the unit
manufacturing cost increases, the relative advantage of the remanufacturing strategy increases.
Therefore, for a low-margin product, especially if remanufacturing is cheap, it may be desirable for
the OEM to set up a remanufacturing operation. This allows the OEM not only to benefit from
the residual value in the product, but also to preempt entry by third parties into the lucrative
remanufacturing market. Finally, we focus on a market characteristic, consumer acceptance of the
remanufactured product, as measured by consumers’ relative willingness-to-pay for this product.
We find that as market acceptance increases, the relative advantage of the remanufacturing strategy
increases. Thus, market acceptance of the remanufactured product increases the legitimacy of a
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.
Maxq2n,q2rΠ2(q2n, q2r|q1) = (p2n − c)q2n + p2rq2r − hq
2
2r
s.t.q2r ≤ γq1, q2n ≥ 0, q2r ≥ 0.




−2δ −2δ − 2h

, whose
leading coefficient is negative and whose determinant 4δ(1− δ) + 4h is positive. Thus, the Hessian
is negative definite and the profit function is concave in (q2n, q2r). The Lagrangean is
L(q2n, q2r, λ) = (1 − q2n − δq2r − c)q2n + δ(1 − q2n − q2r)q2r − hq
2
r − λ(q2r − γq1) + µ1q2n + µ2q2r.
∂L
∂q2n
= −2q2n + 1 − 2δq2r − c + µ1
∂L
∂q2r
= −2δq2n − 2(δ + h)q2r + δ − λ + µ2
Since the profit function is concave, necessary conditions and sufficient conditions for optimality
are that these FOC = 0, as well as λ(q2r − γq1) = 0, µ1q2n = 0, µ2q2r = 0, λ ≥ 0, µ1 ≥ 0 and
µ2 ≥ 0.
Case 1. q2r = γq1. Then λ ≥ 0, µ2 = 0. Also take q2n > 0. Then µ1 = 0. Solving the FOC
gives q2n =
1−c
2 − δγq1 and λ = 2(δ
2 − δ − h)γq1 + δc. If γq1 <
1−c
2δ , then q2n > 0 holds. The





2 . Π2 = (δ
2 − δ − h)γ2q21 + cδγq1 +
(1−c)2
4 .
Case 2: 0 < q2r < γq1 and q2n > 0. Then λ = 0, µ1 = 0 and µ2 = 0. Solving for the first order
conditions gives q2n =
δ2−δ−h+c(δ+h)
2(δ2−δ−h)
and q2r = −
δc
2(δ2−δ−h)















> 0 to hold for this case to be valid.
Case 3: 0 < q2r < γq1 and q2n = 0. Then λ = 0 and µ2 = 0. Solving the FOC gives q2r =
δ
2(δ+h)
and µ = δ
2−δ−h+c(δ+h)
δ+h . q2r > 0 is automatically satisfied. We need γq1 >
δ
2(δ+h) for this case to be
valid. In addition, we need δ2 − δ − h + c(δ + h) ≥ 0. The prices are as follows: p2n = 1 −
δ2
2(δ+h)







Case 4: q2r = γq1 and q2n = 0. Then µ2 = 0. Solving the FOC gives λ = δ − 2γq1(δ + h) and
µ1 = −1 + 2δγq1 + c. Non-negativity conditions require γq1 ≤
δ
2(δ+h) and γq1 ≥
1−c
2δ . The prices
are as follows: p2n = 1 − δγq1 and p2r = δ(1 − γq1). Π2 = δγq1 − (δ + h)γ
2q21.
Case 5: q2r = 0 and q2n > 0. Then µ1 = 0 and λ = 0. Solving the FOC gives q2n =
1−c
2 and
µ2 = −δc. The prices are p2n =
1+c
2 and p2r = δ
1+c
2 . Π2 =
(1−c)2
4 . But µ2 ≥ 0 cannot be satisfied,
so this case cannot occur.
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Case 6: Both quantities 0. Then λ = 0. Solving the FOC gives µ1 = c − 1 and µ2 = −δ. So
this cannot happen unless c − 1 > 0, or, c > 1, which we ruled out in §3 since otherwise, no new
product would be sold in period 1.
With c < 1, these last two cases show that q2r = 0 is ruled out. So there are a total of four













































2 − δ − h)γq1 + δc ≥ 0









2 − δ − h + c(δ + h) ≥ 0
4) γq1 ≤
δ




For Case 2 to exist, we need δ2 − δ − h < 0, which is always true since δ < 1. With this




2δ , γq1 ≤ −
δc
2(δ2−δ−h)
2) γq1 > −
δc
2(δ2−δ−h)




2 − δ − h + c(δ + h) ≥ 0
4) γq1 ≤
δ









2δ , γq1 ≤ −
δc
2(δ2−δ−h)



















The second condition in Cases 2 and 3 have only to do with the parameters of the problem. So
these cases cannot simultaneously hold. Also, if we compare the two limits in Case 1, we find that
the resulting inequality is the same as the second condition in Cases 2 and 3: 1−c2δγ > −
δc
2γ(δ2−δ−h)
is the same as the condition δ2(δ+h) <
1−c
2δ . Thus, given the condition c < 1, the optimal solution
can be summarized by two cases, with mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive regions for
the value of q1.
Case I: δ2(δ+h) <
1−c
2δ , or, h >
δ(c−1+δ)








Case II: δ2(δ+h) ≥
1−c
2δ , or, h ≤
δ(c−1+δ)




2δγ ≤ q1 ≤
δ
2γ(δ+h) , and q1 >
δ
2γ(δ+h) , respectively.
These cases are tabulated in the statement of Proposition 1 using expressions from Table 2a.
Proof of Proposition 2. Recall that we are working under the assumption h > δ(c−1+δ)1−c . First,
we need to check that Π∗2(q1) is continuous at the boundary q1 = q̄ of the two regions. Since
cδγq1−(h+δ−δ
2)γ2q21 evaluated at γq1 = q̄ is
cδq̄
2 , this is true. The derivative of Π
∗
2(q1) with respect
to q1 for the region q1 < q̄ is 2γ
2q1(δ
2−δ−h)+cδγ. It should be positive since increasing q1 relaxes
the constraint. Indeed, 2γ2q1(δ
2−δ−h)+cδγ > 0 for γq1 < q̄, which is exactly what defines Region
1. At the boundary, the derivative is 0, so not only is Π∗2(q1) continuous, but it is also continuously
differentiable since Π∗2(q1) is constant for γq1 > q̄. Therefore, Π(q1) = (1 − q1 − c)q1 + Π
∗
2(q1) is
also continuously differentiable. In addition, it is strictly concave in q1.
Taking the derivative of Π(q1) with respect to q1, we find
1 − c − 2q1 + (2γ
2q1(δ
2 − δ − h) + cδγ)I{γq1≤q̄}.
At the boundary γq1 = q̄, the derivative is 1 − c − 2q̄/γ. If this is negative (
q̄
γ
> 1−c2 ), it means
that the optimum is reached at γq∗1 < q̄; if it is positive, the optimum is reached at γq
∗
1 > q̄. In the
former case, q∗1 =
1−c(1−δγ)
2(1−γ2(δ2−δ−h))
and the remanufacturing quantity in period 2 is constrained by






. In the latter case, the optimal solution is q∗1 =
1−c
2






Finally, note that the condition q̄
γ




Proof of Proposition 3. Recall h̃ = δc−δγ(1−δ)(1−c)(1−c)γ . For h < h̃, ∆1
.





4 . For h ≥ h̃, ∆2
.
= Π∗ − Π̃∗ = cδq̄2 . Thus, the incremental profit as a function of h (not taking
into account fixed costs) is ∆(h)
.
= ∆1I{h<h̃} + ∆2I{h≥h̃}. Since Π
∗ strictly decreases in h, we can
find a threshold h̄ satisfying ∆(h̄) = F . When the threshold is reached in the region where h < h̃,
it has the form h̄ = 4F (γ
2δ2−γ2δ−1)+δ2γ2(1−2c+2c2)+δ(2cγ(1−c)−γ2(1−c)2)
γ2((1−c)2+4F )
(obtained by solving for h in






by solving for h in ∆2(h) = F ). For h < h̄, it is optimal for the manufacturer to remanufacture its
products in period 2; otherwise it is more profitable to only offer new products in period 2.




2 . For a given level of q1, maximizing (8) with respect to q̄2r yields the unique solution
q̄∗2r(q2n) = min(γq1,
(1−q2n)δ
2(δ+h) ). Under our assumption that h >
δ(c−1+δ)
1−c , the two best-response
curves intersect exactly once. First consider the lines q2n =
1−c−δq̄2r
2 and q̄2r =
(1−q2n)δ
2(δ+h) . Their






. Therefore, if (1+c)δ
4δ+4h−δ2
< γq1,




2 . In the former case,




for the OEM and δ
2(1+c)2(δ+h)
(4δ+4h−δ2)2
− F for the entrant. In









Appendix B : Derivation of Inverse Demand Functions
As stated in Assumption 4, we assume consumers’ willingness-to-pay (valuations) are distributed
uniformly in the interval φ ∈ [0, 1] and that in any period, each consumer uses at most one unit.
Therefore, for a total market size of M consumers, the quantity of product purchased at price p1
in the first period is q1 = M(1 − p1). Normalizing the size of the market to 1 gives q1 = 1 − p1.
Thus, the inverse demand function for the first period is p1 = 1 − q1.
For the second period inverse demand functions, we follow the lead of Desai and Purohit (1998)
and derive them directly from the consumer utility functions. Note that the net utility, NU, from
using a unit in the second period is
NU = δmφ − p2z, (9)
where m is an indicator variable such that m = 0 if the unit is new, m = 1 if the unit is remanu-
factured, and p2z is the second period price of new (z = n) or remanufactured (z = r) units.
Consider the problem facing consumers in period 2. Each consumer has to choose from one of
the three following strategies: (i) buy a new unit (N); (ii) buy a remanufactured unit (R); (iii) be
inactive (X). In terms of consumer utility, if all three strategies are observed in equilibrium, then
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consumers who follow a N strategy value the product more (i.e., have a higher φ) than consumers
who follow a R strategy, who value it more than consumers who follow an X strategy.
Now consider the lowest valuation consumer who adopts an R strategy. This consumer is located
at a point φ′ = 1 − q2n − q2r on the [0, 1] line and is indifferent between following a R and an X
strategy. From (9), this consumer’s net utility from a R strategy is δ(1 − q2n − q2r) − p2r, and the
utility from following an X strategy is 0. Equating these two gives a second period price for the
remanufactured product of
p2r = δ(1 − q2n − q2r) .
Finally, consider the lowest valuation of the consumer who adopts an N strategy. This consumer
is located at a point φ′′ = 1− q2n and is indifferent between the N and R strategies. The net utility
from a N strategy is 1 − q2n − p2n. Similarly, the net utility from buying a remanufactured unit is
δ(1 − q2n) − p2r. Equating these two utilities gives a second period price of the new product of
p2n = 1 − q2n − δq2r .
Appendix C: Disposal Cost
In this section we add a disposal cost for units collected but not processed, y − x. The most likely
scenario in this situation is a constant per unit cost that increases linearly in the number of units
disposed. Let hd represent the per unit cost of disposal. The firm’s sub-optimization problem (4)
of how many units to collect and what percentage to process is now:
Λ(x) = min
x≤y≤γq1
[hc(y) + hp(x, y) + hd(y − x)] .
As before, we approximate the total cost to remanufacture x units as h̄xλ̄ where h̄ and λ̄ are





As long as the least squares fit results in λ̄ > 1 then all conceptual results based on Propositions
1-5 continue to hold but the threshold values that define the regions where remanufacturing is
profitable will shift. In other words, as long as the total variable remanufacturing cost remains
convex increasing then the OEM and the entrant still face the thresholds levels for h̄ and F ,
below which it is profitable to remanufacture. The inclusion of a disposal cost simply shifts these
thresholds higher, making remanufacturing less attractive for both the OEM and the entrant. If
disposal of the units results in a positive revenue instead of a cost, the thresholds would shift down
and remanufacturing becomes more attractive than in the base case (no disposal cost).
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For the choice of entry-deterrent strategy, Observations 2 and 3 also continue to hold. With
everything else held constant, an increase in the new product manufacturing cost and/or the relative
willingness-to-pay increases the attractiveness of the remanufacturing strategy. Observation 1 (a
lower collection cost increases the attractiveness of the collection strategy) continues to hold as well,
but the magnitude changes with the addition of a disposal cost. A disposal cost for unprocessed
units increases both the OEM’s collection cost and the entrant’s variable remanufacturing cost.
Thus, the quantity the OEM needs to collect to deter entry depends on both hp and hd as opposed
to only hp in the no disposal cost case.
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